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America's Interest in the Reparation Conference 
By GEORGE P. A U L D , Former Accountant-General of the Reparation Commission 
TH E reparation negotiations now being conducted in Paris by the Young Com-
mittee are of large practical consequence 
to this country in our international rela-
tions and our domestic affairs. 
The subject matter of the conference is 
one which ever since the war has had the 
most important effects on the political and 
economic life of Europe, and we can hardly 
fail to follow with absorbed attention, 
the writing of a new chapter in this great 
controversy. 
As an exporting nation of the first magni-
tude, we cannot remain unaffected by the 
outcome of the conference. Annually we 
ship abroad five billion dollars' worth of the 
products of our factories, farms, forests, 
and mines. These exports, of which Europe 
takes nearly half, amount to seven or eight 
per cent. of our total production. This 
represents a highly important proportion 
of our activity, and any substantial de-
crease in it would throw our industries into 
the doldrums. Five years ago our Euro-
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pean customers were quarreling bitterly 
over the reparation question, and the ill 
effects of the dispute were felt in almost 
every department of their political and 
economic life. With the adoption of the 
Dawes Plan, there followed a period of 
remarkable political appeasement and eco-
nomic recovery, and today a new group of 
skilful practitioners of international finance 
is preparing a modification or completion 
of that plan, looking to a new era of ad-
vanced convalescence in Europe. 
Our second large economic interest in 
the settlement obviously lies in our stake 
as investors in European securities. This 
stake is an important one, though possibly 
not of the dimensions which common 
opinion assigns to it. In a study of mine 
in the January Annals of the American 
Academy (Philadelphia) it is suggested 
that the conservative estimates of the 
Department of Commerce relating to the 
amount of our foreign holdings deserve to 
be given great weight, despite the existence 
of other estimates of considerably larger 
size. The mean of the Department's esti-
mates, as of January 1, 1928, indicated 
about three and one-half billion dollars 
invested in Europe. This figure of our 
gross holdings, moderate as it is, is sub-
stantially offset by nearly three billions of 
our own securities held by Europeans (our 
total world investment being estimated at 
twelve and one-half billions, and the total 
offset for foreigners' holdings here at three 
and three-quarter billions, leaving a net 
foreign investment of eight and three-
quarter billion dollars). In addition, there 
are, of course, the inter-ally debts, the dis-
counted value of which, at four per cent., as 
determined by the United States Treasury, 
is 7.47 billion dollars. 
One reason for not lightly dismissing 
these relatively low estimates is this: The 
total of our yearly balances of exports over 
imports (including invisible items), since 
we started in 1915 to liquidate our then 
debtor position of about four and one-half 
billion dollars, falls short, by over four 
billion dollars, of indicating a present 
foreign investment of even the size esti-
mated by the Department of Commerce. 
The invisible items in these estimates of 
our trade balances (which for the past 
several years have been compiled by the 
Commerce Department) are admittedly 
very difficult to determine. Nevertheless, 
the discrepancy still has to be accounted 
for, and further point is given to it by the 
statement of the Department that other 
compilers who reach higher estimates of 
our foreign holdings, have not taken suffi-
cient account of "back-wash" or resales 
and redemptions of foreign securities, sub-
sequent to the sale of the original offerings 
in our investment market. 
The net figures, after offsets of this 
nature, are seldom published as conspicu-
ously as the periodical announcements of 
the considerably larger gross figures of 
foreign issues taken here. The par value 
of such issues, in each of the years 1927 
and 1928, amounted roughly to one and 
one-half billion dollars. The net figure for 
1927, however, after estimated "back-
wash" and increase in foreigners' holdings 
in the United States, was only seven 
hundred million dollars (the 1928 net figure 
not being yet available). 
Carrying gross figures in our minds, and 
having no long tradition of foreign invest-
ing back of us, we seem, from time to time, 
to suffer from a certain nervous apprehen-
siveness, which is not, in fact, justified. 
We shall perhaps eventually learn to 
measure our foreign investments by the 
yardstick of England. British earnings in 
1927 from such sources, according to their 
Board of Trade reports, amounted to 1.35 
billion dollars, which is six per cent. on a 
principal sum of twenty-two and one-half 
billions. 
This business of investing our surplus 
funds abroad, though perhaps less in an-
nual amount than we have recently been 
accustomed to believe, is nevertheless of 
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great importance. It is becoming of in-
creasing consequence to us that Europe 
remain a good credit risk. One reason, of 
course, is that we want our present loans 
paid at maturity. But, broadly speaking, 
that will unquestionably happen, what-
ever temporary disturbances arise in 
Europe. The continuous year-to-year 
peace and prosperity of Europe are im-
portant to us, because we cannot afford 
to have any interruption occur in the con-
tinuous placing of our surplus funds 
abroad. Upon the new loans (though, in 
fact, hardly less upon the expenditures of 
our tourists abroad) the maintenance of 
our export trade depends. These new 
loans provide our foreign customers with 
the dollars necessary to pay for our sur-
pluses of exports over imports. 
What, then, will be the effect of the new 
reparation settlement on these varied in-
terests of a material nature which we have 
in the stability of Europe? If the con-
ference has a successful termination—and 
the prestige, experience, and practical 
sagacity of its members make such an out-
come probable—Germany's now indeter-
minate reparation liability will be definitely 
fixed to the reasonable satisfaction of all 
parties concerned, the present foreign con-
trol in Germany will probably be relaxed 
and the framework of a scheme for the 
future marketing of reparation bonds may 
perhaps be provided. 
Such a series of accomplishments will 
not only constitute a distinct advance in 
the formal position of the reparation prob-
lem; they will also result in a substantial 
easing of the tensions which, in some 
measure, still remain over from the great 
conflict. In short, we may hope that the 
new settlement will strengthen the psycho-
logical foundations upon which the peace 
of Europe rests, and will give added vigor 
to the functioning of a normal economic 
regime, 
